1 2 3 4 5 6	MIKE McGRATH Montana Attorney General ANTHONY JOHNSTONE PAMELA BUCY Assistant Attorneys General 215 North Sanders P.O. Box 201401 Helena, MT 59620-1401 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS				
7 8	MONTANA EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT				
9	CASCADE COUNTY				
10	MONTANANS FOR JUSTICE: VOTE) Cause No. CDV-06-1162				
11	NO ON CI-98, NOT IN MONTANA: CITIZENS AGAINST CI-97 AND				
12	PROPERTY OWNERS AGAINST I-154, Political Ballot Committees,				
13	Plaintiffs,				
15	v. STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR EXPEDITED				
16	STATE OF MONTANA, by and through BRAD JOHNSON, in his capacity as				
17	Secretary of State; MONTANANS IN ACTION, a Montana Corporation, CITIZENS RIGHT TO RECALL				
18	MONTANA, PROTECT OUR HOMES / MONTANA, STOP OVER SPENDING /				
19 20	MONTANA, Political Ballot Committees; and TREVIS BUTCHER,				
21	Defendants.				
22	With its Answer filed today, the State of Montana hereby responds to				
23	Plaintiffs' Complaint and Motion for an Expedited Hearing and Other Relief.				
24	BACKGROUND				
25	The Secretary of State is the statewide elected official responsible for				
26	certifying qualified ballot issues for the election ballot, but he only plays a part in				
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gatherers throughout the state circulated petition forms approved by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-202. Each set of signed petitions was accompanied by an affidavit by a person who "gathered or assisted in gathering the signatures on the petition to which this affidavit is attached." Mont.

Code Ann. § 13-27-302. Every signature gatherer was required to attest:

I believe the signatures on the petition are genuine, are the signatures of the persons whose names they purport to be, and are the signatures of Montana electors who are registered at the address or have the telephone number following the person's signature, and that the signers knew the contents of the petition before signing the petition.

<u>Id.</u> Knowingly falsifying an affidavit is a misdemeanor subject to a \$500 fine or six months imprisonment, or both. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13-27-106 & 45-7-203.

Signed petitions were submitted to the county election administrators at least four weeks before they were due to the Secretary of State (June 23, 2006), and until then any person could have withdrawn his name from the petitions. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-301. Within four weeks of receiving signed petitions, the county election administrators verified that all signers are registered electors of the county, and that randomly selected signatures on each petition are genuine. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-303(1). For all petitions that appeared to contain genuine signatures, a county election administrator certified the total number of valid signatures and forwarded the petitions to the Secretary of State in batches containing petitions from several gatherers. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-304; (Miller Aff ¶ 6). Any time before the petitions were forwarded to the Secretary of State, a registered voter could have challenged signatures in a county, and required the county election administrator to verify all signatures on a challenged petition. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-306. If a fraudulent or duplicate signature was discovered at any time, the election administrator could have submitted the name of the signer and the signature gatherer to the county attorney. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-303.

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The Secretary of State received the petitions from the county election administrators by July 21. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-104. Only signatures on petitions notarized or certified by county election administrators were tabulated, unless the petitions did not meet statutory requirements. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-307. However, any petitions with "[c]lerical or technical errors that do not interfere with the ability to judge the sufficiency of signatures on the petition do not render a petition void," and therefore were included in the total tally. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-201. If one petition contained such an error, the entire batch containing that petition was set aside and counted as defective, even if the majority of the petitions in the batch had no errors. (Miller Aff. ¶ 10.) As soon as petitions containing a sufficient number of signatures were filed with the Secretary of State, he "immediately certif[ied] to the governor that the completed petition has been officially filed." Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-308. Valid signatures that the Secretary of State received after a petition has been certified for the ballot were tallied for a total signature count, but not counted toward certification; these surplus signatures provide a margin of error in the event any signatures are invalid. The certifications and final tallies of the ballot issues Plaintiffs challenge are as follows (Miller Aff.):

Title	Certified Tally (date certified)	Final Tally (July 21, 2006)	Tally w/ errors* (July 21, 2006)	King Signatures** (valid & invalid)
CI-97	47,905 signatures,	48,016 signatures,	52,084 signatures,	16,149
	55 districts	55 districts	60 districts	
	(July 21, 2006)	(+3,401 margin)	(+7,469 margin)	
CI-98	49,956 signatures,	50,097 signatures,	51,706 signatures,	14,731
	60 districts	60 districts	60 districts	
	(July 21, 2006)	(+5,482 margin)	(+7,091 margin)	
I-154	27,748 signatures,	35,871 signatures,	36,604 signatures,	9,574
	54 districts	71 districts	72 districts	
	(July 20, 2006)	(+13,563 margin)	(+14,296 margin)	

^{*} Clerical or technical errors include omissions of: printed names (by county staff, notaries, or signature gatherers), seals or signatures (by county staff or notaries), county or address (by notaries or signature gatherers), or date of first signatures (by signature gatherers). See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-201; (Miller Aff. ¶ 8). Also included in the technical errors were 62 total signatures gathered by Robert Colby, who has testified he used an incorrect address on his petition affidavits; another 6 signatures gathered by Mr. Colby were included in the Final Tally. (Miller Aff. ¶ 17.)

^{**} Gross number of signatures submitted by Marvin King contained in certified petitions, without discounting for invalid signatures. *Due to the inclusion of invalid signatures, these figures overstate the number of King signatures counted toward certification.* (Miller Aff. ¶ 16.)

As the statutory qualification process indicates, there are multiple levels of review and multiple opportunities for voters to bring forth fraud allegations. Plaintiffs' Complaint in this Court represents the last clear chance in the process to remedy potential fraud, and the window of opportunity for review is narrow. On August 24, the Secretary of State certified ballots containing all three ballot issues to county election administrators, and the counties began to prepare and print the ballots. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-12-201. Ballot printing may take between two to three weeks. Absentee and military ballots must be sent out no later than September 22. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-1-104(1). Once the general election is held, "[t]he sufficiency of the initiative petition shall not be questioned" and Plaintiffs' claims become moot by either the approval or rejection of each ballot issue by the general electorate. Mont. Const. art. III, § 4(3).

ARGUMENT

This action raises serious allegations of fraud in the petition process for three statewide initiatives due to be voted upon in the general election. But these allegations do not lie against the Secretary of State. Nor does the State take a position on whether the allegations are true. While the Secretary has made all reasonable efforts under the law to detect and reject illegal signatures in his tabulation, only this Court can consider, and remedy if necessary, Plaintiffs' factual claims of pervasive fraud in the petition process.

Plaintiffs bring their action pursuant to the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court to hear "a contest of a ballot issue" for "violation of the law relating to qualifications for inclusion on the ballot" or "illegal petition signatures or an erroneous or fraudulent count or canvass of petition signatures." Mont. Code Ann. § 3-5-302(6); Compl. at ¶ 6. They state three claims for relief: (1) all signatures obtained by professional signature gatherers should be discarded because of a

"pervasive pattern of illegal and deceptive practices" (Compl. at ¶ 26); (2) all signatures gathered by Marvin King should be discarded because of his "failure . . . to follow the proper certification process" (Compl. at ¶ 27); and (3) "all signatures submitted by gatherers giving false addresses should be discarded" (Compl. at ¶ 28).

The State urges this Court to consider Plaintiffs' claims carefully and quickly. Carefully, because in addition to the dangers posed by actual fraud in petition gathering, there is the converse threat that an improper remedy could disenfranchise innocent petition signers. Quickly, because counties already have begun to print their ballots, and must send out tens of thousands of absentee ballots in less than a month. While it takes no position on the fraud allegations before the court, the State offers this brief to clarify the legal and factual issues raised.

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THE LEGAL BASIS FOR PRE-ELECTION INVALIDATION OF I. INITIATIVE PETITION SIGNATURES UNDER MONTANA LAW.

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The regulation of ballot processes involves two weighty but countervailing interests. As one court has put it:

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Any sensible laws regulating the time, place and manner of voting in a democracy ought to focus on two goals: maximizing the participation of eligible voters and eliminating fraud. However, these goals often are in tension, since regulations that guard against fraud may also raise barriers so high that some eligible voters may not be able to pass. Similarly, relaxing the rules that protect against voting more than once in a single election and verify eligibility may increase the possibility of fraud.

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Bay County Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. Supp. 2d 404, 411 (E.D. Mich.

2004). In the context of ballot issue petitions, the Supreme Court has spoken more directly:

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Petition circulation . . . is core political speech, because it involves interactive communication concerning political change. First Amendment protection for such interaction . . . is at its zenith. We

have also recognized, however, that there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.

<u>Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found.</u>, 525 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1999) (citations and quotations omitted).

Montana law strikes this balance with an election code that, on the one hand, presumes the validity of signatures determined to be genuine notwithstanding technical defects in the petitions, Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-201, and on the other, allows the contest of "illegal petition signatures" at any time before the election, Mont. Code Ann. § 3-5-302. This reflects a judgment that fraud must be rooted out, but not at the cost of invalidating legitimate signatures simply because a petition gatherer blundered. In other words, absent fraud or forgery in the signing of the petition, the sin of the gatherer should not be visited on the signer.

A. <u>Defrauding of Signers Invalidates Signatures</u>.

The most egregious conduct Plaintiffs allege, if proved, would require the invalidation of any signatures obtained thereby. For example, the "bait-and-switch" tactic, in which gatherers allegedly obtained signatures on all three initiative petitions by misrepresenting them as "copies" of the first petition signed, clearly would be grounds for invalidation. (Compl. at ¶ 18; Pls' Br. Exs. 2-5.) However, gatherers' use of arguments "that were calculated to inflame passions and manufacture a need" for the initiative (Compl. at ¶ 22) would not support invalidation, to the extent that such arguments are "core political speech" protected by the First Amendment:

The circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change. Although a petition circulator may not have to persuade potential signatories that a particular proposal should prevail to capture their signatures, he or she will at least have to persuade them that the matter is one deserving of the public scrutiny and debate that would attend its consideration by the whole electorate.

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This will in almost every case involve an explanation of the nature of the proposal and why its advocates support it.

Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988) (footnote omitted); see also Citizens Comm. for the D.C. Video Lottery Terminal Initiative v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 860 A.2d 813, 814 (D.C. 2004) (Citizens Committee) (noting "significant First Amendment concerns . . . regarding the Board's exclusion of signatures based on 'false advertising,'" and declining to rely on those grounds to invalidate signatures).

Similarly, Plaintiffs' claim for the blanket invalidation of "all signatures obtained by professional signature gatherers" is overbroad. (Compl. at ¶ 26.) Any proven fraud by particular individuals or groups of paid signature gatherers should be remedied, if necessary, by invalidation of signatures. See Citizens Committee, 860 A.2d at 817 (invalidating signatures collected by professional signature gatherer organization when 83% of gatherers from that organization who testified admitted to illegal signatures). But the mere "payment of petition circulators," without more, is protected First Amendment expression. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 428. Moreover, "[f]raud or guilty knowledge will not be imputed to the circulator, but must be affirmatively established." In re Initiative Petition No. 272, 388 P.2d 290, 293 (Okla. 1963); see also In re Bower, 242 N.E.2d 252, 258 (Ill. 1968) ("We do not believe that such fraud was shown on the part of the two circulators who were called to testify as to justify striking the signatures procured by all 43 circulators; the trial court therefore acted correctly in refusing to strike all of the signatures on the recall petitions because of isolated instances of proof that certain signatures were improper").

B. <u>Technical Defects Do Not Invalidate Signatures.</u>

It is important to distinguish between actual fraud in the inducement of petition signatures and "[c]lerical or technical errors that do not interfere with the

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ability to judge the sufficiency of signatures on the petition" that "do not render a petition void." Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-201. This distinction is particularly critical here, where there is no allegation of forged signatures and the Secretary of State tallied a sufficient number of certified genuine signatures lacking technical defects to qualify each initiative at issue. See State ex rel. Freeze v. Taylor, 90 Mont. 439, 447 (1931) (rejecting challenge to petitions based on omission of voter addresses where "[t]here is not any allegation . . . that the signatures appearing in the petition were not the genuine signatures of the electors.").

For example, the allegations concerning gatherer Robert Colby, who has admitted to using a false address in his Montana affidavits (Pls' Br. Ex. 1) but submitted only 68 signatures for all three initiatives (Miller Aff. ¶ 17), would be insufficient to decertify the ballot issues given the apparent authenticity of the underlying signatures and the few he submitted. See United Labor Committee v. <u>Kirkpatrick</u>, 572 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Mo. 1978) ("The only statutory purpose in having a notary sign the petition to begin with is to provide a double check on the validity of the signatures of the voters. If the validity of the voters' signatures can be otherwise verified, their signatures should not be invalidated by the notary's negligence or deliberate misconduct."). Absent any reliance by petition signers on the gatherer's residency, a falsified address does not render a petition void. See Nelson v. Keisling, 964 P.2d 284, 290 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting claim for invalidation of signatures due to false verification of gatherer's residency, when "there is neither evidence nor argument as to who relied on the fact that individuals collecting initiative petition signatures falsely represented themselves to be registered Oregon voters or as to how anyone was injured as a result."); cf. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 786 (N.D. 1979) (voter address requirements "should not work to the disadvantage of the qualified electors who signed the petition and expected their signatures to be counted.").

The allegations concerning Marvin King are more difficult to assess by this "technical error" standard. While it appears he was an impossibly prodigious signature gatherer, the law actually required him only to attest that he "gathered or assisted in gathering the signatures on the petition to which this affidavit is attached on the stated dates." Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-302. In this respect, Montana law has a relatively lax standard for gatherer certification, where other states require the affiant to be in the presence of the signer. Compare id. with D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(h)(3) (circulator must attest that he "was in the presence of each person when the appended signature was written"); Or. Rev. Stat. § 249.740(4) ("The circulator shall certify on each signature sheet that the individuals signed the sheet in the presence of the circulator"). Thus, unlike the "false signing" violations of the D.C. presence requirement proved in Citizens Committee, 860 A.2d at 814, Montana law suggests that it is not illegal in itself for a gatherer to assist in the collection of signatures outside of his presence.

Additionally, the "gross" total number of signatures Mr. King submitted significantly overstates the actual "net" number of valid signatures that were certified. Due to the "batching" of signature certifications at the county level, it is difficult to ascertain how many signatures certified as valid by counties (and therefore counted toward certification by the Secretary of State) actually are attributable to Mr. King. (Miller Aff. ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs apparently have not accounted for these invalid signatures, and in the event one or more signature gatherers' petitions are invalidated the Court should ensure against "over-invalidating" signatures that did not count toward certification in the first place.

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II. PLAINTIFFS' REMEDY WILL BECOME IMPRACTICABLE OR MOOT IN A MATTER OF WEEKS.

Although "[a] contest of a ballot issue . . . may be brought at any time after discovery of illegal petition signatures or an erroneous or fraudulent count or canvass of petition signatures," Mont. Code Ann. § 3-5-202(6)(b), legal and practical factors limit the time available for effective relief.

A. There Is No Basis for Dual Ballot Certification.

Plaintiffs' demand that the Secretary of State certify to the counties two ballots, one with and one without the ballot initiatives at issue, is futile. Factually, there is no reason to think that just two ballots would be enough, since there are eight possible ballot combinations depending on which of the three initiatives remain certified, and scores of separate ballot forms for each locality. Legally, on the day the State was served with Plaintiffs' motion, the Secretary of State already had certified all three initiatives pursuant to the deadline provided in Mont. Code Ann. § 13-12-201.

More importantly, Counties already have gone to press with their ballots, and incurred considerable printing expenses to do so. Once the ballots have been printed two to three weeks from now, there will remain a small window of time before absentee ballots must be sent out on September 22. Any final legal resolution of Plaintiffs' claims after that window closes runs the risk of absentee and military voters being presented with and voting on ballot issues that are dead letters. Later, the only practicable remedy would be not to count the votes on any decertified initiative.

B. The Sufficiency of the Petition May Not Be Questioned After the Election is Held.

The Montana Constitution provides that "[t]he sufficiency of the initiative petition shall not be questioned after the election is held." Mont. Const. art. III, § 4(3). This provision was proposed in 1972 by Delegate Joyce, who as an assistant attorney general had defended an initiative after its enactment against challenges "that the petitions that had been circulated in the various counties were insufficient, that some of the names were forgeries, and that sort of thing." Const. Con. Verb. Tr. at 2698. Therefore he offered the amendment to "make it perfectly clear in the future that once the election is held, why, you can't challenge the sufficiency of the petitions." Id. at 2699.

With its adoption, the provision simply confirms the principle that the Supreme Court had applied in Delegate Joyce's case: "after the people have voted on the measure and a great majority of the voters throughout the state have expressed their approval, the courts presume that the public interest was there and technical objections to the petition or its sufficiency are disregarded." State ex rel. Graham v. Board of Examiners, 125 Mont. 419, 427-28, 239 P.2d 283, 289 (1951); see also Martin v. State Highway Comm'n, 107 Mont. 603, 614-15, 88 P.2d 41, 47 (1939) ("[I]t is a rule of well-nigh uniform recognition that after an election has been held, a party will not be permitted to challenge it unless he can show that a different result would have been reached but for the conditions of which he complains"), quoting Potter v. Furnish, 46 Mont. 391, 394, 128 P. 542, 543 (1912).

1 CONCLUSION 2 Resolution of Plaintiffs' claims will require careful and quick examination of 3 the facts presented on both sides. The State does not take a position on what those 4 facts will show. However, based on its consideration of Montana law the State 5 would concentrate the Court's attention on the single issue that may require invalidation of signatures and, possibly, decertification of one or more ballot issues: 6 7 the fraudulent inducement of petition signatures. 8 Respectfully submitted this 29th day of August, 2006. 9 MIKE McGRATH Montana Attorney General PAMELA BUCÝ 10 Assistant Attorney General Justice Building 11 P.O. Box 201401 Helena, MT 59620-1401 12 13 By: **ANTHONY JOHNSTONE** 14 Assistant Attorney General 15 16 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 17 I hereby certify that I caused a true and accurate copy of the foregoing State's 18 Response to Motion for Expedited Hearing and Other Relief to be mailed to: 19 Mr. Trevis Butcher Mr. Peter Michael Meloy P.O. Box 7 Ms. Robin A. Meguire 20 Winifred, MT 59489-0007 Meloy Trieweiler 80 South Warren 21 Helena, MT 59624-1241 Mr. Russell Bradley 695 Garneill Loop Garneill, MT 59453 22 Ms. Janice Doggett Legal Counsel 23 Montana Secretary of State P.O. Box 202801 24 Helena, MT 59620-2801 25 26 DATED: